Public Interest Litigants in the Court of Session
When Lords Hope and Reed reformed the law of standing in AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate 1 they grounded that change firmly in constitutional principle. To restrict standing to those for whom a private right or interest is at stake was, in Lord Reed's view, "incompatible with the courts' function of preserving the rule of law," precisely because "[a] public authority can violate the rule of law without infringing the rights of any individual." 2 Thus, their Lordships agreed that (in public law judicial review cases at least) the time had come to consign the title and interest test to the dustbin. For Lord Reed, drawing a direct parallel with the approach taken in England and Wales, the correct terminology must now be standing, based on sufficient interest. 3 For Lord Hope, the words "directly affected", construed broadly to include those acting with genuine concern for the public interest even in the absence of any private right or interest of their own, was appropriate. 4 A difference of terminology aside, it is clear that in terms of the substantive effect of this change the Scottish justices were as one:
judicial review in Scotland would no longer be about private rights and individual grievances but (to borrow from Sedley J) about public wrongs and the maintenance of the rule of law. 5 It would seem, however, that the Court of Session has so far pushed back against the public interest justification for judicial review that underpins this shift, restricting opportunities for public interest litigants to appear either as petitioners or as public-spirited interveners. This article seeks to explain that claim. Institute we see AXA and Walton applied in ways which lower the threshold of standing but which, by requiring public interest litigants to be fully engaged in prior political processes and to be possessed of expertise in lieu of enforceable legal rights, nevertheless impose a more substantial barrier to litigation than might be placed before their counterparts in England and Wales. It is an approach which still focuses too heavily on the characteristics of the petitioner rather than the public interest in hearing the petition. In Scotland, however, public interest interventions are viewed with some scepticism.
A. STANDING

B. THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS
The procedure for public interest interventions appears in rule 58.8A of the Rules of Court.
Since its introduction in 2000, there is only one reported instance of this procedure being used successfully. In Scotch Whisky Association, Petitioner 27 Lord Hodge allowed a charity, Alcohol Focus Scotland ("AFS"), to intervene in a challenge to the validity of the Alcohol (Minimum Unit Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012, recognising that the challenge raised a matter of public interest (alcohol abuse and associated harm); that the intervention would neither unduly delay the hearing nor increase the costs thereof; that the analysis put by AFS in support of the contested policy was distinct from that being made by the Scottish Ministers;
and that the intervention would therefore be of benefit to the court.
Subsequently, however, the record has been much bleaker. AFS themselves were refused permission to intervene by way of a 5000 word written submission when the petition was reclaimed to the Inner House. 28 There, in a short (and rather blunt) opinion, Lord Eassie took the view that the point of European law upon which AFS sought to intervene had been heard but even had this not been so, the intervention would add nothing of substance to the arguments put by the parties. This seems questionable, however, not only in light of the preliminary reference made by the Inner House, which would allow two further opportunities to make substantive arguments (in Luxemburg, and again in Scotland applying the reference) but also in light of the minute of intervention, which introduced an argument about subsidiarity, and which sought to develop an argument about the role of the precautionary principle in the proportionality analysis, neither of which were dealt with in the Lord Ordinary's first instance decision. 29 Furthermore, Lord Eassie took the view that AFS had sought to intervene primarily in the erroneous belief that they would (or could) by virtue of that intervention be granted the status of a "party" to the proceedings, thus enabling the applicants to secure locus standi to make written and oral arguments on the issue before the Court of Justice of the EU ("CJEU" 
C. CONCLUSION
The Court of Session is frequently in public law cases a final court and, in devolved areas, possesses some of the characteristics of a constitutional court. Seen in this context, the judgments by the Supreme Court in AXA and in Walton ought rightly to be praised for shifting the underlying justification for judicial review in Scotland away from the redress of individual grievances towards the public interest in maintaining the rule of law. For would be public interest litigants, however, the reluctance with which the Court of Session has followed that pivot presents barriers (whether structural, procedural, principled or something less tangible still) that remain to be confronted and overcome in processes of dialogue between the Court of Session and counsel on the one hand and the Supreme Court on the other.
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